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REFLECTIONS ON SUBSTANCE AND FORM IN THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS CLASSROOM 
DONI GEWIRTZMAN* 
AUTHOR’S NOTE 
Last year, I taught Sexuality and the Law for the first time.  While teaching 
the course, I observed a wide disparity between my students’ high level of 
interest and enthusiasm for the course and my own response to what was 
happening in the classroom.  I found myself frustrated and unhappy, not with 
the students or their performance, but with the decisions I made about how we 
spent our time.  The choices I made were bad ones, and I am no doubt guilty of 
many of the pedagogical sins that are cataloged in the pages that follow. 
This Essay is an effort to work through the reasons why I made those 
choices, and how I might avoid making the same mistakes twice.  In reflecting 
upon the experience, I have found it helpful to generalize, exaggerate, and 
overstate what “typical” law professors do in their classrooms.  It is my hope 
that this admittedly distorted and broad-brush approach will—like a 
magnifying glass—make the nature of certain pedagogical choices more 
transparent, and highlight the larger value commitments that are at stake when 
we make decisions about how to teach.  It is in no way intended to denigrate 
the many innovative teachers among our ranks, or to ignore the nuanced and 
varied approaches those teachers have adopted. 
INTRODUCTION 
In an ideal universe, there is a direct, holistic relationship between what we 
teach and how we teach—between substance and form.  When substance and 
form align, our pedagogy reflects, models, and creates an experiential 
manifestation of the subject matter’s core components and central conflicts.  In 
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this perfected vision of the classroom, the essence of what we teach is 
embodied by how we teach, and the decisions we make about how we teach 
reflect substantive judgments about law, our legal system, and the nature of the 
profession itself. 
Yet all too often, legal education treats substance and form as distant 
cousins.  The formal components of classroom teaching remain largely the 
same, regardless of the subject under review.  In the day-to-day, give-and-take 
of the classroom, a contracts class looks like a torts class, and a torts class runs 
the same way as a constitutional law course.  The answers to the questions 
“how to teach constitutional law” or “how to teach torts” focus on adding or 
subtracting cases from a casebook, emphasizing or deemphasizing particular 
historical developments, or advocating the adoption of a grand unified theory 
that unites disparate subject matter. 
This turns course design into a question of substance rather than form.  The 
result is limited pedagogical variance from class to class, professor to 
professor, or institution to institution. True experimentation and innovation are 
absent, and plain vanilla remains the perpetual entrée du jour. 
In order to create true alignment between substance and form, we must ask 
what is at the heart of our substance, which is no easy question given the broad 
and undefined category of “civil rights.”  Beyond providing familiarity with a 
laundry list of canonical cases, statutes, and constitutional provisions, what 
core substantive conflicts are acted out through the drama of the classroom? 
Within the civil rights arena, I came to think about the meta-substance of 
my course as three interrelated dualistic conflicts that not only appear 
repeatedly throughout the doctrine, but are inherent to the very nature of what 
law is and what clients seek to resolve through our legal system.  These 
conflicts are: the battle between coercion and freedom,1 the battle between 
“public and private,”2 and the battle between “law and love.”3 
All three conflicts are inevitable given the ways in which any legal regime 
achieves dominance and perpetuates itself.  First, law—as a cultural practice—
requires some form of coercion to maintain its power and legitimacy, often 
using compliance techniques that restrict and devalue freedom.  Second, law 
inevitably imposes itself into the private sphere, bringing external public norms 
into relationships and places where its presence may be unfamiliar and 
unwelcome.  Finally, law creates categories of people and things and allocates 
 
 1. See generally PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED (Myra Bergman Ramos 
trans., 1993) (1970). 
 2. See BELL HOOKS, TEACHING TO TRANSGRESS: EDUCATION AS THE PRACTICE OF 
FREEDOM 16 (1994). 
 3. PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RESTRUCTURING LEGAL 
SCHOLARSHIP 121 (1999). 
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them into a hierarchy, bringing the finalized legal regime into tension with the 
unbounded and egalitarian nature of universal love.4 
Just as inevitably, the core dramatic conflicts that take place within the 
classroom replicate the substantive tensions behind what we teach.  In this 
way, the civil rights classroom—whether we like it or not—serves as a space 
for “acting out” each of these three battles.  Through their in-class behaviors, 
professor and student alike are engaged in acts of coercion and liberation, 
pushing at or reinforcing the boundaries between public and private, and 
managing the tensions between law and love. 
In the civil rights context, the gap between substance and form is 
particularly stark.  In terms of form, the standard law school classroom 
reinforces each of the three dualities and takes a clear stand in favor of one side 
or the other: it sides with coercion against freedom, maintains a rigid boundary 
between public and private, and polarizes the divide between law and love.  
These ever-present realities present challenges for aligning substance and form 
in a civil rights course, where the substance is often related to exposing, 
questioning, and undermining the ideologies reinforced by our signature 
pedagogical approach. 
This Essay, building on observations by critical education and legal 
theorists like Paulo Friere, Duncan Kennedy, Robert Cover, Paul Kahn, bell 
hooks, and others, is an effort to make the disconnect between substance and 
form more explicit.  Rather than serving as a “how-to” manual for teaching a 
civil rights course, it suggests that any answer to the question “how to teach 
civil rights” should inquire into each of the three core conflicts that constitute 
the underlying meta-substance of the course.  In turn, these substantive 
struggles require the civil rights professor to revisit many of the deeply 
ingrained formal habits of law school teaching, towards the eventual goal of 
creating synergy between substance and form. 
I.  THE BATTLE BETWEEN COERCION AND FREEDOM 
The law school classroom is a fearful and angry place.  Most of the fear 
and anger is not on full display, but it is there, lurking under the surface, being 
silently channeled back and forth between professor and student. 
The fear and anger derives from what the Carnegie Report refers to as legal 
education’s “signature pedagogy”: the case dialogue.5  As the Carnegie Report 
describes it, the case dialogue is a largely teacher-centered exercise, where the 
professor “is clearly the focal point” and where “it is relatively rare . . . for 
students to address one another directly.”6  All knowledge is mediated through 
 
 4. See id. at 121–22. 
 5. See WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE 
PROFESSION OF LAW 23–24 (2007). 
 6. Id. at 49–50. 
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a single figure that sits atop a hierarchy, a hierarchy that replicates, as Duncan 
Kennedy noted, “relations between junior associates and senior partners . . . 
between lawyers and judges.”7  We see professors, in bell hooks’ words, who 
are “enthralled by the exercise of power and authority within their mini-
kingdom, the classroom.”8 
In its current form, our signature pedagogy, detached as it is from the 
nature of the subject matter, provides our students with one reliable point of 
confluence between substance and form: a first-hand, ringside-seat encounter 
with the coercive power of law.  The professor controls the discussion through 
an elaborately scripted Socratic or quasi-Socratic dialogue.  Questions are 
asked, for which there is a desired response, and if the response is not given, 
the professor finds a way—either through reinterpreting the student’s comment 
or calling on another student—to get the answer she wants.  As anyone who 
has written a standard-issue syllabus or lesson plan knows, there is very limited 
room for movement or departure from the lesson plan itself, virtually no room 
for debate about the content of the course, the structure of the discussion, the 
method of evaluation, or much of anything else.  There is next to no chance 
that the class itself will construct new knowledge—most of the time, classroom 
discussion consists of the arguments outlined in majority or dissenting 
opinions restated in a more accessible way (i.e. reading comprehension), or to 
bring forth an underlying academic theory advanced by the professor or 
already articulated by another expert.  Because all knowledge is mediated 
through the professor, there is virtually no opportunity for students to surpass 
the professor in their mastery of the material or in their analytic capabilities.  
Most speech, other than the professor’s, operates in a highly regulated 
environment.  All rules about the classroom are sent down as dictates from on 
high, with the professor at the top of a clearly defined hierarchy that makes it 
evident, at every available opportunity, who is in charge.9  It is not a model of 
democratic governance.  It is not a model for, to use educational theorist Paulo 
Friere’s word, “liberation.”10 
Instead, the pedagogy models the coercive power of law, where our actions 
are manipulated—consciously or unconsciously—in ways that restrain 
individuality and self-expression.  And like most populations that are subjected 
to the coercive power of law, it generates anger and fear in those that are at the 
bottom of the totem pole. 
 
 7. DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY: A 
POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM 77 (2004).  Kennedy’s essay contains many of the core concepts 
identified in this section, though his terminology is somewhat different. 
 8. See HOOKS, supra note 2, at 17. 
 9. FREIRE, supra note 1, at 73. 
 10. Id. at 70. 
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The anger and fear exist from the teacher’s vantage point as well.  The 
subconscious fantasy on the professor’s end is that the classroom will become 
“not law.”  It will descend into anarchy, or revolution, or some other form of 
social chaos that exposes the undeniable fact that there are one hundred ten 
students, and only one professor.11  Moreover, those students pay the 
professor’s salary, and may—in a moment of sudden self-realization—decide 
that they are entitled to some degree of power as a result.  It is the same fear 
that most despots encounter throughout their reign.  And the professor, like 
most dictators (both benevolent and malevolent), responds by using the 
coercive power of law to full effect: imposing themselves at the top of a rigid 
classroom hierarchy, constraining the exchange of knowledge between 
members of the classroom community, conducting an evaluation process that 
lacks transparency or an effective means of appeal, and ruling by fiat. 
This serves some purpose in professional training.  As Duncan Kennedy 
observed, compliance with rules, a respect for institutions, and a willingness to 
operate within hierarchical structures are essential components of what it 
means to be a legal professional in contemporary America.12  In this way, the 
pedagogy does indeed unite substance and form by inculcating compliance 
with law’s coercive power as a professional value, though usually without the 
critical awareness, transparency, or experiential components necessary for 
professors or students to fully internalize its benefits or question the costs of 
law’s regime. 
By contrast, the substance of civil rights law presents the relationship 
between coercion and freedom as far more complex and mutually dependent.  
On one hand, the corpus of modern civil rights law developed as a direct and 
antagonistic response to law’s coercive power. The Civil Rights Act of 1964,13 
the Voting Rights Act,14 the Americans with Disabilities Act,15 and countless 
other federal, state, and local civil rights statutes are the products of social 
movement activism that, at one point, mobilized under the banner of freedom 
against the detrimental effects of law’s coercive power on particular 
communities.16 
Yet, once each social movement achieved mainstream acceptance, law—as 
embodied by statutory reform and enforcement practices—was the primary 
 
 11. See HOOKS, supra note 2, at 188 (“Fear of losing control in the classroom often leads 
individual professors to fall into a conventional teaching pattern wherein power is used 
destructively.”) 
 12. KENNEDY, supra note 7, at 71. 
 13. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (current version at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e (2006)). 
 14. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006). 
 15. Id. § 12101. 
 16. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on the 
Development of Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002). 
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vehicle for these movements to memorialize and consolidate their gains.  As 
Paul Kahn noted, “Revolution is thus the source and underlying truth of law.”17  
Each social movement, as it gained acceptance, enshrined its vision of the 
world by relying on law’s coercive capacity to achieve a radically different set 
of social goals. 
Hence, ambivalence about law’s relationship to coercion and freedom is 
built into the substance of the course.  Civil rights law has a rich history of 
questioning the utility and moral justification for legally enforced power 
structures, while nevertheless adopting legal means to achieve different ends.  
It is a complexity that is missing in the design of our signature pedagogy, 
creating a wide chasm between the nuance of the subject matter and the brute 
coercion of our form. 
In my classroom, the substance–form divide between coercion and 
freedom manifested itself on a daily basis.  While the substance reflected cases 
about lesbians and gay men who, at deep personal cost, bravely challenged 
power structures and social expectations, my pedagogical form provided no 
opportunities for that courage to manifest itself in the classroom environment.  
The management of classroom discussions was strictly top-down, as I 
unilaterally imposed content, guided discussion towards personal areas of 
interest, and restated student comments so that they aligned with my own goals 
for the course.  The result was a personal sense of despair after each class, 
brought about by the feeling that my teaching practice was reinforcing 
precisely the sort of social hierarchies that were challenged in the cases we 
read.  There was no room for revolution. 
Hierarchies themselves are not necessarily bad.  They enable individuals to 
coordinate behavior, minimize conflict, specialize skills, discourage the 
shirking of responsibility, motivate individuals to perform, and make their 
behavior more efficient.  And there are good reasons for some hierarchy within 
a classroom—the professor’s superior level of expertise, the efficiencies of 
allowing one person to make quick and authoritative decisions, and a culture of 
expectations among law students that often craves hierarchy in its most 1L, 
Paper Chase-like manifestations. 
Yet the hierarchical form of my classroom seemed ill matched to the 
substance of the class.  The next time I teach the course, I plan to explore ways 
to give students greater control over the class agenda by creating opportunities 
for student-led discussions, group projects, and other mechanisms designed to 
foster greater autonomy and ownership over the classroom experience.  
Coercion, whether explicit or implicit, cannot function as the primary 
pedagogical dynamic in a civil rights classroom. 
 
 17. KAHN, supra note 3, at 120–21. 
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II.  THE BATTLE BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
Our signature pedagogy maintains a rigid boundary between public and 
private.18  The private lived experience of students is suppressed and treated as 
not only irrelevant, but an inappropriate distraction from the important public 
work of the classroom.  The case-based nature of the classroom inquiry, which 
calls upon students to exclude so much of human experience as irrelevant in 
the search for “material facts,” depersonalizes the rich and diverse nature of 
human experience into a set of archetypal case narratives for public 
consumption.19  And it provides virtually no opportunity to systematically 
reflect on how the law affects the aspects of the self that are essential to who 
we are but often defy our efforts to translate them into the language of the law 
school classroom: our sense of right and wrong, our racial or sexual identity, or 
the challenging interpersonal dilemmas that arise out of even the most 
mundane professional interactions.  The result is a private self that is 
disintegrated from and suppressed by a public professional identity, and a 
classroom environment that excludes so much of how we make sense of our 
jobs and the external world. 
As with coercion and freedom, the professor’s desire to maintain a clear 
line between public and private serves some valuable professional training 
objectives.  Lawyers are valued for their ability to suppress their own private 
desires in the service of a client’s needs, as well as their ability to exercise 
independent professional judgment that is untainted by emotions or other 
judgment-distorting elements of the private self. 
Yet this bright-line divide between public and private is particularly out of 
place in the civil rights classroom.  In part, this is because students often take 
the course in order to bridge the gap between public and private, to make sense 
of their own private experience as existing within or outside a socially salient 
category like race or sexuality, and to directly address the ways that a public 
legal regime impacts the construction of their private self. 
And in part, it is because the pedagogical approach fails to reflect the 
complexity with which civil rights law has addressed the substantive line 
between public and private. On one hand, much of civil rights law has been 
designed to take areas of human interaction that were once deemed private and 
make them public.  Prior to the development of statutory remedies for civil 
rights violations, the early civil rights constitutional “canon” was built around 
 
 18. See HOOKS, supra note 2, at 16. 
 19. Leah Ward Sears, formerly of the Supreme Court of Georgia, provides an excellent 
example of this need to recognize human experience over rigid law in a dissent arguing for a 
broader understanding of adoption in inheritance cases.  O’Neal v. Wilkes, 439 S.E.2d 439, 492–
94 (1994) (Sears-Collins, J., dissenting) (majority upholding Georgia law requiring legal adoption 
and denying potential inheritance rights on the basis of equitable adoption). 
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cases defining the scope of state action doctrine20 and establishing a rigid 
dichotomy between the political (i.e. public) sphere, which was deemed 
appropriate for legal regulation, and the social (i.e. private) sphere, which was 
considered off-limits.21  Much of civil rights reform has been dedicated to 
questioning, challenging, and supplanting this dichotomy by broadening the 
spaces in which public constitutional norms may apply and through statutory 
reforms that have taken areas that were once considered matters of private 
choice (i.e. the ability of private actors to discriminate) and subjecting them to 
public norms. It is no surprise, therefore, that the social movements that drove 
civil rights reform originated in acts of consciousness-raising, where 
participants drew on personal testimonials and other forms of self-expression 
to consider the ways that public life infiltrates and distorts the private self. 
In other areas, civil rights reform has taken spheres of social engagement 
that were once public and made them private.  In courses like Sexuality and the 
Law, the public/private distinction infiltrates virtually every area of the course, 
as the class explores whether and why an individual’s choice of sexual 
partners, the decision to engage in a particular sex act, or to choose a particular 
family structure is a legitimate matter for public concern. 
The marriage of substance and form asks the civil rights teacher to reflect 
on the division between public and private in the classroom itself.  After all, 
how can we fully engage the boundary between what is public and what is 
private when those boundaries are so rigidly maintained in practice by our 
signature pedagogy?  The civil rights classroom environment is fertile ground 
for working through law’s unresolved and ambivalent relationship with these 
issues, as students make deliberate decisions about what aspects of their lives 
they wish to share with the rest of the class, the degree to which their lived 
experience ought to be subject to public scrutiny, and which aspects they 
choose to remain private.  The same questions confront the professor as well, 
who must reconcile dueling obligations: to model the sort of vulnerability and 
personal reflection that makes the potential for self-actualization and 
professional satisfaction that much more possible, or to model the sort of 
professional distance between public and private that facilitates legal 
judgment. 
My classroom, like most, rigidly maintained the boundary between public 
and private.  As a result, a course that should have drawn rich links between 
individual experience and legal rules and structures adopted the impersonal 
approach of an antitrust seminar.  And while I was certainly “out” as a gay 
man, the specific dynamics within my own private life that led me to teach the 
course remained closeted and suppressed.  The next time I teach the course, I 
plan to be a little braver, allowing myself to speak more from personal 
 
 20. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 21. See, eg., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896). 
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experience, but also to encourage students to draw explicit links between the 
course substance and their own lives. This becomes particularly challenging in 
a sexuality course, where generational distinctions between professor and 
student are often stark.  Today’s law students often have a very different 
relationship with “coming out” than their professors.  They may think about 
gay identity in different ways, their relationship with their families may be 
very different, and their perceptions about the ways that homophobia affects 
their lives may also be different.  A course that maintains a rigid boundary 
between public and private suppresses these differences, and in turn, stifles 
intellectual exchanges that would ultimately serve the goals of the course. 
This is not to suggest a “right answer” for balancing the competing 
demands of public and private, or to advocate for a classroom environment that 
resembles a confessional booth or a therapist’s couch.  For now, it is simply 
enough to ask civil rights professors to interrogate the status quo of our 
signature pedagogy, and to welcome opportunities for professor and student 
alike to situate their respective experiences within the substantive context of 
the classroom. 
III.  THE BATTLE BETWEEN LAW AND LOVE 
In his book The Cultural Study of Law, Paul Kahn casts law and love in 
opposition to one another. While law is based in rationality, category-based 
hierarchies, and “division and distinction,”22 the ideal of love—in the John 
Lennon “Imagine” sense of the word—is based in emotion and equality, and 
seeks to advance “the abolition of borders and the common community of 
mankind.”23 
The process by which law achieves supremacy over love has at least two 
features, both of which are replicated within the law school classroom.  First, 
law’s dominance occurs, as Robert Cover observed, through a “jurispathic” 
process in which alternative legal interpretations are systematically suppressed, 
struck down, or dismissed.24  As Cover points out, there is a violent aspect to 
this interpretive winnowing process, as law’s coercive features are invoked to 
elevate certain interpretive perspectives while striking down competing 
versions of legal meaning.25 
In practice, our signature pedagogy shares this pathology.  Students 
generate alternative visions of legal regimes all the time.  One by one, either 
from the professor’s mouth or through student dialogue that is solicited or 
manipulated by the professor, these alternative visions—often driven by 
 
 22. KAHN, supra note 3, at 121. 
 23. Id. at 122. 
 24. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 
97 HARV L. REV. 4, 40 (1983). 
 25. Id. 
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emotion, morality, or amorphous concerns about justice—are struck down as 
irrational.  Or unrealistic.  Or off-topic.  In this way, the signature pedagogy 
leaves a sense of alienation and dissociation in its wake, as law becomes 
detached from internal value commitments that pre-date law’s intrusion into 
our individual consciousness.  The law school classroom—imbued with the 
jurispathic characteristics of law itself—is where dreams come to die.  It is 
where hot air balloons run out of steam, and begin the long, steep descent back 
to earth. 
Second, law attains its superiority over love by exalting its rational 
components, situating itself as the vehicle by which logic triumphs over the 
emotions and thereby constraining “the emotionality of the behavior that gives 
rise to legal disputes.”26  While love is the realm of the intuitive, the unruly, 
and the unpredictable, law promotes order, stability, cognition, and 
consistency. 
Our signature pedagogy replicates law’s triumph over love.  The law 
school classroom operates to suppress emotion and intuition by systematically 
devaluing comments tinged with feelings while granting exalted status to the 
cognitive and rational realm. The professor maintains a monopoly on emotive 
content through a relentless focus on getting students to “think like lawyers” 
and the egocentric theatrics of the classroom performance. 
The result of law’s triumph over love in the classroom is an environment 
where students are deprived of both feeling and a sense of possibility and 
imagination.  While this process has significant value for professional 
training—legal discourse demands a particular type of performance from its 
practitioners and, at times, must distance itself from emotion to maintain its 
legitimacy—it creates a schism in our students, one in which professional 
identities become completely separated from an emotional sense of self.  
Moreover, it results in lawyers who are ill-equipped to manage the emotional 
content of their interactions with colleagues and clients, precisely because the 
bulk of their professional training—unlike a growing number of business and 
medical schools27—ignores the interpersonal dynamics at the heart of any 
professional relationship. 
In contrast to the law school classroom, civil rights law has never been 
content to allow law and love to exist in separate spheres. Perhaps more than 
any other area of law, civil rights law has embraced love’s potential by 
bridging gaps between emotion and rationality and setting forward an “I Have 
a Dream” narrative ideal of a fully inclusive social structure without 
categories, boundaries, or hierarchies.  It has been built on an ability to idealize 
 
 26. Richard A. Posner, Emotion Versus Emotionalism in Law, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 
309, 309 (Susan Bandes ed., 1999). 
 27. See, e.g., MOHAMMADREZA HOJAT, EMPATHY IN PATIENT CARE: ANTECEDENTS, 
DEVELOPMENT, MEASUREMENT, AND OUTCOMES 4 (2007). 
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and imagine different utopias and better versions of the world we live in.  It 
has challenged existing categorizations and boundaries between people, and 
sought ways to legalize alternative and more inclusive social structures. 
Moreover, emotions and feelings have always been a driving force behind 
the development of civil rights law, and emotional content has often been a 
transparent part of interpretation.  From Selma to Stonewall, social movements 
have long used emotional triggers by inducing shame, compassion, empathy, 
guilt, and pride to motivate legal change.28  As a result, it is no surprise that 
emotional content has become a part of civil rights jurisprudence, from the 
Casey joint opinion’s “sweet-mystery-of-life” passage29 to Justice Kennedy’s 
references to the “transcendent” link between liberty and sexual intimacy in 
Lawrence.30 
Emotions were kept on limited display and a tight leash in my classroom.  
Statements by students that began “I feel” were often met with eye-rolls from 
their peers, and I often responded by moving the student towards more familiar 
ground.  The result was a disconnect between subject matter that provoked 
deep emotional responses that were closely tied to moral development, and a 
classroom environment that suppressed emotional expression by valuing 
cognition über alles.  At the very least, my next effort to teach the course will 
openly interrogate the appropriate role of emotion in a law school classroom 
and try to create space for feelings and thinking to coexist. 
CONCLUSION 
It is little wonder that many law students experience our signature 
pedagogy as deeply wounding to their sense of self.  It is, after all, a process 
that—in its most pure manifestations—replicates the more coercive and 
jurispathic aspects of law itself. 
In her book Teaching to Transgress, bell hooks describes teaching as a 
healing profession.31  Given the nature of its substance, there is no better place 
than the civil rights classroom to heal the wounds created by the way we teach.  
We can bridge the gap between coercion and freedom by deliberately altering 
the power dynamic in the classroom.  We can engage the distinction between 
public and private by providing opportunities to situate the lived experience of 
both professor and student within the subject matter of the course.  And we can 
offer a vision of the world where law and love coexist by imagining alternative 
futures and finding a place for emotional content. 
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Let me be clear: a law school classroom is neither a Montessori school nor 
a Pete Seeger concert.  It is—and should be—a venue for students to learn law, 
the inculcation of shared cultural norms, and the development of sound 
professional judgment. 
At the same time, it is impossible to teach civil rights law without 
maintaining a critical eye towards the sets of rules, structures, and practices 
that create hierarchies within a society.  True synergy between substance and 
form requires applying that same critical eye to the drama of the classroom, 
and seeking out opportunities for student and professor alike to experience the 
ambivalence and confusion that lies between each of these stark dualities.  
Much as the substance of civil rights doctrine has served as a corrective for 
law’s more extreme manifestations, the civil rights classroom ought to serve as 
a corrective for the more extreme manifestations of our pedagogical form. 
